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A criminal defendant's rights to be proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt 2 and to a trial by jury3 are fundamental axioms
of American criminal procedure. The right to have all the essential elements of guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt " 'safeguard[s] men from dubious and unjust convictions, with
resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and property.'
Similarly,
the right to ajury trial guarantees that laypeoples' common sense
and community standards, rather than the potentially arid and
unsympathetic culture of the court, will be brought to bear on
the defendant's case. 5
A series of decisions in the United States Supreme Court has
seriously weakened both the right to proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the right to trial by jury in federal criminal
trials. As a consequence, federal criminal defendants are subject
to a regime that (1) defines crimes narrowly, thereby effectively
reducing the number of facts that a jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt to find the defendant guilty; and (2) authorizes
punishment for those narrowly-defined crimes based upon factors determined not by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, but
by the presiding judge under a lesser burden of proof. In this
regime, a criminal defendant's rights to have the essential elements of guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt and to have a
jury, not a judge, determine guilt or innocence, are significantly
weaker than they were even a few years ago.
The thesis of this Article is that current due process and
Sixth Amendment doctrines have abandoned the values that
",4

I LEWIS

CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 95 (Bantam ed., 1981).
See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... ); U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by
Jury ... ").
4 Winship, 397 U.S. at 362 (quoting Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488
(1895)).
5 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) ("Providing the accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable
safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant,
biased, or eccentric judge."); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 & n.15
(1968) (juries express "the conscience of the community").
2
3
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those constitutional provisions were supposed to serve. Moreover, the doctrines fail to provide sufficient guidance to the inferior courts, and undermine the liberal political theory underlying
the federal penal system. Parts III and IV of this Article develop
this thesis, but it is necessary to lay a groundwork first. Thus,
Part I provides three illustrations of the diminished importance
of "criminal acts" - that is, those acts that a jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt to convict a criminal defendant - relative to "sentencing facts" - those facts that, after conviction, a
court may take into consideration in sentencing a defendant.
These illustrations involve sentencing practices under the federal
statutes relating to the distribution of narcotics and under the
federal Sentencing Guidelines (the Guidelines). The narcotics
statutes and the Guidelines are particularly good illustrations of
the dominance of sentencing facts because of their obvious prevalence and significance to the administration of federal criminal
law.
Part II reviews the development and recent decline of the
criminal defendant's due process right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt and Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. It demonstrates how history has culminated into what is here termed the
McMillan-Walton doctrine, pursuant to which the defendant's
rights are, today, virtual nullities.
Part III focuses on four significant problems with the McMilIan-Walton doctrine: its lack of meaningful guidance to the inferior courts; its erosion of the values inherent in the right to a
criminal jury trial; its erroneous abdication of the judicial role in
protecting constitutional rights; and its threat to the notion of
proportionality in punishment that is a recognized cornerstone
of the federal penal system.
Part IV proposes a standard that avoids the shortcomings
discussed in Part III. The proposed standard, which is adapted
from one set forth by Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion in
McMillan v. Pennsylvania,6 avoids the problems that beset the McMilan-Walton doctrine. More importantly, it restores a defendant's rights to have a jury determine guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, and leaves the sentencing judge adequate discretion to
sentence convicted defendants.
6

477 U.S. 79 (1986).
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THREE EXAMPLES OF THE SURPASSING IMPORTANCE OF
SENTENCING FACTS

The Guidelines and the federal narcotics laws promote the
trend of removing decisions from the guilt-determination component of the criminal process, where the defendant enjoys constitutional safeguards, and transferring them to the sentencing
determination, where the defendant does not. Three particular
situations demonstrate this trend: quantity determinations in
narcotics cases; "relevant conduct" determinations under the
Guidelines; and instances in which the Guidelines permit a sentencing judge to punish a defendant based on conduct for which
the defendant has been acquitted.
A.

Quantity Determinations in Drug Cases

Title 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) makes it a crime to manufacture,
distribute, disperse or possess certain controlled substances with
intent to distribute.7 The penalty provisions for violation of
§ 841(a), set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b), apportion penalties
largely in relation to the weight of the controlled substance that
the defendant distributed or possessed with the intent to distribute.8 The penalties vary widely depending upon the weight
of the substance. Consider cocaine: depending upon the weight
of the cocaine that the defendant distributed or possessed, the
defendant might face zero years in jail or a lifetime in jail and
might have to pay no fine or a fine of four million dollars.9
Although the weight of the controlled substance is a critical
factor in determining the severity of the defendant's sentence,
and although the length of the sentence may vary widely depending upon the weight of the drugs involved, courts have uniformly
held that the quantity of the controlled substance is not an element of an offense." ° Rather, the court considers quantity in sen7 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1988).
8 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
9 Compare 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A) (penalty for five kilograms or more of co-

caine) with 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(B) (penalty for less than 500 grams (one half a
kilogram) of cocaine). The range of potential sentences for other drugs is equally
wide, depending principally on the quantity of drugs at issue.
10 See generally United States v. Campuzano, 905 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 363 (1990); United States v. Brown, 887 F.2d 537, 540 (5th Cir.
1989); United States v.Jenkins, 866 F.2d 331, 334 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Wood, 834 F.2d 1382, 1388-90 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Gibbs, 813 F.2d
596, 599-600 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 822 (1987); United States v. Normandeau, 800 F.2d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. McHugh, 769 F.2d
860, 868 (lst Cir. 1985).
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tencing the defendant. Indeed, it has been held that where the
issue of quantity is presented to the jury - for example, if the
indictment alleges that the defendant distributed a specified
amount of a drug, or if the jury is presented with a special verdict
form that requires it to find that the defendant distributed a specified amount - the sentencing court may disregard the jury's
findings, and base its sentence on a greater quantity than the jury
found to exist. I
The courts interpreting the federal narcotics laws have relied
in most instances on two arguments to support their exclusion of
quantity from the guilt-determination phase. First, the courts
frequently note that possession with intent to distribute any
quantity of narcotics is a criminal act, and conclude from this observation that the quantity of narcotics involved must simply be a
sentence enhancement. 2 The reasoning appears to be that if a
certain action is criminal in and of itself, then any factor that
measures the extent of the criminal conduct must not be an element of the crime. But there is nothing in the definition of
"crime" that would require such a result. Moreover, this assumption is not true in practice. Larceny, for example, is criminal regardless of the value of the property unlawfully obtained;
the degree of the criminality, however, is determined by value,
which is an element of the crime and must be determined by a
jury. 1 3 Furthermore, several federal statutes include minimum
dollar amounts that must be proven as elements of the crime.' 4
Courts also rely on the legislative history underlying § 841,
frequently stating that "Congress clearly intended" § 841(b) to
be merely a sentencing enhancement.' 5 Nothing in § 841 or its
legislative history suggests, however, that Congress intended different burdens of proof to apply to § § 841 (a) and 841 (b); indeed,
Congress never mentions burden of proof in this context. 1 6 This
silence is telling: the same public law that includes § 841 also
II See United States v. Madkour, 930 F.2d 234, 237 (2d Cir. 1991).

See, e.g., Campuzano, 905 F.2d at 679 ("Because the quantity is relevant only to
enhancement of the sentence, the government is not required to prove the quantity
).
alleged ....
13 See 3 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAw § 357, at 309-10 (14th
ed. 1980).
14 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1988 & Supp. 1992) (interstate transportation of
goods worth over $5000).
15 See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 866 F.2d 331, 334 (10th Cir. 1989).
16 See generally Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-513, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1988 & Supp.
1992)).
12
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includes a forfeiture section that contains express provisions con17
cerning burden of proof on other matters.
The consequences of this statutorily dubious approach are
clear. First, the burden of proof is lower at the sentencing hearing than at trial. In addition, other constitutional safeguards that
protect the defendant at trial are not available at the sentencing
hearing. For example, hearsay may be admitted without reservation at a sentencing hearing, because the defendant has no right
to confront the witnesses against him;18 the defendant does not
have the right of compulsory process;' 9 and evidence suppressed
at trial under the the Fourth Amendment may be used at sentencing.2 ° The right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, to confrontation and to compulsory process are all accuracy-enhancing
17 See 21 U.S.C. § 885 (1988). Both § 841 and § 885 were part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-513. That the
provisions of §§ 841 (a) and 841 (b) are set forth in separate sections does not mean
that the latter section is simply a sentencing enhancement of the former. Courts
have, in other instances, found that elements of a criminal act may be set forth
under separate sections. See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 957 F.2d 72 (2d Cir.
1992) (willfulness requirement set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D), which establishes the penalty for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (a)(1), is an element of the crime
proscribed by § 922(a)(1)); United States v. Campos-Martinez, 976 F.2d 589 (9th
Cir. 1992) (elements of crime are found in both 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and
§ 1326(b)(1)).
18 See, e.g., United States v. Hershberger, 962 F.2d 1548, 1553-54 (10th Cir.
1992) ("reliable hearsay evidence [may be] used during the sentencing phase without the right of confrontation and cross-examination"); United States v. Kikumura,
918 F.2d 1084, 1102-03 (3d Cir. 1990) (Hearsay statements can be admitted at
sentencing if "other evidence indicates that they are reasonably trustworthy.");
United States v. Pugliese, 805 F.2d 1117, 1122-23 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that it is
not error for district court judge to consider information developed at sentencing
hearing), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1067 (1989). See generally Note, An Argument for Confrontation under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1880 (1992).
19 See United States v. Prescott, 920 F.2d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 1990) ("A defendant
has no absolute right to present witnesses or to receive a full-blown evidentiary
hearing.").
20 See, e.g., United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256 (2d Cir. 1992) (sentencing
court can use illegally obtained evidence if it was not seized for the purpose of
sentencing); United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 68, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (leaving open the question of whether the Fourth Amendment right to privacy has any
force in the sentencing stage, but noting that "evidence inadmissible at trial may be
admissible at sentencing.... Where there is no showing of a violation of the Fourth
Amendment purposefully designed to obtain evidence to increase a defendant's
base offense level at sentencing," there is no ground to suppress evidence from an
illegal search); United States v. Torres, 926 F.2d 321, 325 (3d Cir. 1991)
("[E]vidence suppressed as in violation of the Fourth Amendment may be considered in determining appropriate guideline ranges."); United States v. Graves, 785
F.2d 870, 876 (10th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he additional deterrent effect of extending application of the exclusionary rule to sentencing procedures.., would be so minimal
as to be insignificant."); United States v. Butler, 680 F.2d 1055, 1056 (5th Cir.

1993]

CRIMINAL SENTENCING

465

rights - rights that tend to make the result of the proceeding
more certain than it would otherwise be. 2 1 Their absence in the
sentencing phase means that determinations made there, including decisions about the quantity of drugs that the defendant distributed or conspired to distribute, tend to be less accurate than
those made at trial.
B.

Relevant Conduct under the Guidelines

The Guidelines fix a defendant's sentence within the statutorily prescribed maximum and minimum ranges.2 2 They assign a
"base offense level" to the crime of conviction. Once the base
offense level is determined, the court considers a series of potential specific offense "characteristics" and "adjustments" that
move the base offense level up or down, resulting in an "adjusted
base offense level." Following the determination of the defendant's adjusted base offense level, the court consults the defendant's criminal record and converts it, according to a prescribed
method, into a quantity of criminal history "points" - the more
serious the prior record, the greater the number of points. The
court then consults a matrix provided by the Guidelines, one axis
of which is the adjusted base offense level and the other axis of
which is the criminal history points. The intersection of the defendant's adjusted base offense level and criminal history points
yields the defendant's sentencing range.
In determining a defendant's base offense level, the Court
1982) (evidence inadmissible at trial is admissible for sentencing purposes because
deterrent value during sentencing phase is minimal).
21 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970) (explaining that right to
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is an accuracy-enhancing right) (discussed infra at
notes 45-50 and accompanying text); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980)
("[The Confrontation Clause's] underlying purpose [is] to augment accuracy in the
factfinding process by ensuring the defendant an effective means to test adverse
evidence .... "). The obvious purpose of the Compulsory Process Clause is to
assist defendants in procuring witnesses favorable to their version of events. By
contrast, criminal defendants' rights to privacy and against self-incrimination are
not accuracy-enhancing rights, but serve other ulterior goals, namely, the preservation of a person's privacy and dignity. See generally Arnold H. Loewy, Police-Obtained
Evidence and the Constitution: DistinguishingUnconstitutionally ObtainedEvidence from Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 907 (1989).
22 What follows is a rough description of the workings of the Guidelines that is
adequate for purposes of this Article. It assumes that there is only a one count
indictment, and thus does not refer to the practice of grouping counts. See FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D (West 1992) [hereinafter GUIDELINES]. In
relatively unusual cases, the Guidelines mandate a sentence above the statutory
maximum or below the statutory minimum. In such cases, the Guidelines provide
that the sentence should be the statutory maximum or minimum, accordingly.
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considers not simply the offense of conviction, but also considers
a defendant's wrongful activity in connection with the offense of
conviction. More specifically, the Guidelines instruct the sentencingjudge to sentence the defendant on the basis of "relevant
conduct" surrounding the offense of conviction. 3 For most
crimes, the Guidelines define relevant conduct as follows:
[A]ll acts or omissions committed or aided and abetted by the
defendant, or for which the defendant would be otherwise accountable, that occurred during the commission of the offense
of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course
of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that of24
fense, or that otherwise were in furtherance of that offense.
For crimes in which the total amount of harm or loss is important in
determining the sentence, most typically drug and money crimes,
the Guidelines define relevant conduct to include "all such acts and
omissions that were part of the same course of conduct or common
25
scheme or plan as the offense of conviction."
23 See GUIDELINES supra note 22, § IB1.3.
24 See id. § 1BI.3(a)(1).
25 Id. § 1B1.3(a)(2); see also id. § 3DI.2 (discussing groups of closely related
counts).
On November 1, 1992, approximately two months before this Article was sent
to the printer, the Sentencing Commission promulgated an amendment to the definition of relevant conduct. The definition currently reads as follows:
[Relevant conduct is]...
(A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, procured, or wilfully caused by the defendant;
and
(B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal
plan, scheme, endeavor or enterprise, undertaken by the defendant in
concert with others, whether or not charged in a conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the
jointly undertaken criminal activity, that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in
the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that
offense, or that otherwise were in furtherance of that offense.
Id. § IBI.3(a)(4).
Section 1B.3(a)(2) now provides that relevant conduct includes "acts and
omissions described insubdivisions 1(A)and I(B) above that were part of the same
course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction." See 57

FED. REG. 20148 (May 11, 1992).

It is too early to include in this Article any cases interpreting the new relevantconduct guidelines. The plain intent of the amendments is to limit the scope of
relevant conduct. See id. at 20148-50. The amendments, however, may not lead to
a substantial difference in the interpretation of relevant conduct. First, the Sentencing Commission stated that it views the amendments as merely "clariflying]"
rather than changing the concept of relevant conduct. Thus, a court may determine that its conception of relevant conduct remains the same after the amendments as before. Moreover, the definition of relevant conduct, as amended, is still
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In practice, these definitions permit courts to base their
sentences on a tremendous amount of activity other than the offense
of conviction. Consequently, the sentences that the courts impose
often bear a greater relation to what the court determines to be the
defendant's relevant conduct than to the crimes for which the defendant has actually been convicted. The examples are legion; consideration of a few, chosen almost at random, demonstrates the
point.
** In United States v. Sklar,2 6 the defendant pled guilty to
possessing approximately seventy-five grams of cocaine,
which he had received in an Express Mail package. The
defendant had been arrested holding the package. At the
defendant's sentencing, the government argued that in the
six months preceding his receipt of the package with which
he was arrested, the defendant had received eleven other
Express Mail packages, and that each of the previous
eleven had been filled with similar amounts of cocaine.
Although the eleven prior packages "were never produced
in court, inspected by government agents, or chemically
tested, ' 27 the government argued that the receipt of those
packages constituted "relevant conduct" that should be
taken into account at sentencing. The court accepted this
argument and, relying on postal records that purportedly
demonstrated the similarity of the packages, found by a
preponderance of the evidence that the contents of the
eleven packages were indeed cocaine, and that the approximate weight of the cocaine was 300 grams. 28 The court
placed the defendant in the 37-46 month range for sentencing.2u Had the defendant been sentenced based upon
only what he had been convicted of, he would have been
placed in the 18-24 month range.
** In United States v. Ignancio Munio,3 0 the defendant pled
guilty to transferring $10,840 in counterfeit currency. Had
he been sentenced upon this conduct alone, his sentence
would have been in the range of 10-16 months. Using a
quite broad; the amended definition of relevant conduct would still permit most, if
not all, of the sentencing practices that are described and criticized below.
26 920 F.2d 107 (lst Cir. 1990).
27 Id. at 109.
28 Id. at 112.
29 Id. at 109, 111-12.
30 909 F.2d 436 (11th Cir. 1990).
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preponderance of the evidence standard 3 the court found
that, although the indictment had not charged any more
than $10,840 worth of counterfeit currency, the defendant
had in fact been part of a conspiracy to distribute $1. 1 million in counterfeit currency. 3 2 The Court then placed the
defendant, pursuant to the Guidelines, in the 27-33 month
category.
* * In United States v. Lanese,3 3 the defendant was convicted
of using extortionate means to collect an extension of
credit. The sentencing judge increased the defendant's
sentence based on his involvement in an illegal gambling
operation for which he had never been convicted.
** In United States v. Joyner, 4 a defendant who was convicted for the purchase for resale of two vials of crack-cocaine from a co-defendant was sentenced as if he had
purchased 586 vials of crack-cocaine for resale because that
was the number of vials found on the person of the codefendant.
* * In United States v. Copeland,3 5 the defendant, a crack addicted "steerer" who directed potential buyers to sellers of
crack-cocaine, "steered" an undercover officer to sellers
who sold the undercover officer three vials of crack-cocaine. The defendant was subsequently charged with, and
pled guilty to, possessing three vials of crack with intent to
distribute them. The Second Circuit affirmed the sentencing judge's finding that, because the crack sellers had sixtythree vials of crack on their person when they were arrested, those vials should be attributed to the defendant they were part of his "relevant conduct" - because the
court believed that the defendant would have steered sellers
to buy the sixty-three vials if he had not been arrested.3 6
31 Id. at 439.

Id. at 438.
937 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1991).
34 924 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1991).
35 902 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1990).
36 Id. at 1047-48; see also United States v. Ebbole, 917 F.2d 1495 (7th Cir. 1990)
(uncharged conduct resulted in tripling of sentence); United States v. Miller, 910
F.2d 1321 (6th Cir. 1990) (tripling sentence); United States v. Cohoon, 886 F.2d
1036 (8th Cir. 1989) (doubling sentencing range).
32
33
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Sentencing Facts and Second-Guessing theJury

Frequently a fact may be both an element of a crime and a
specific offense characteristic. For example, 21 U.S.C. § 848
makes it a crime to be a "leader or organizer" of certain criminal
organizations; 37 § 3Bl.1 of the Guidelines likewise mandates an
upward adjustment in the base offense level for a person that the
sentencing court determines to be an "organizer/leader" or a
"manager/supervisor" in a criminal activity."
Similarly, 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) makes it a crime to use or carry a weapon in connection with certain enumerated crimes; 39 the Guidelines provide
that if a person uses, brandishes, or displays a weapon in connection with relevant conduct, that person's base offense level will,
in most instances, receive an upward adjustment.4 °
Because a fact can be both a criminal act and a sentencing
fact, a sentencing court can consider and punish conduct for
which a defendant has been acquitted. For example, even if a
defendant is acquitted of a charge of being a "leader or organizer," a judge at the sentencing phase might still conclude that
the defendant was a leader or organizer and impose punishment
for conduct for which the jury had just acquitted the defendant.
Similarly, a fact may be both an element of a crime and an aggravating factor that could justify an "upward departure" at sentencing.4 1 The courts have almost unanimously determined that a
sentencing court may depart upwardly based upon conduct for
which the defendant has been acquitted.4 2
The courts that have reconsidered, in the sentencing phase,
37 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
38 GUIDELINES, supra note 22, § 3B1.1.
39

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1988 & Supp. 1992).

40 See GUIDELINES, supra note 22, §§ 2Dl.1, 2E2.1; United States v. Carter, 953

F.2d 1449 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 177 (2d
Cir. 1990).
41 An upward departure is an increase beyond the prescribed Guidelines level.
It is supposed to be done only in extraordinary circumstances, where the sentencing judge deems the Guidelines to have inadequately taken into account certain
factors present in a particular case. See generally GUIDELINES, supra note 22, § 5K.
42 For cases in which a sentencing judge departed upwardly based on conduct
for which defendant was acquitted, see United States v. Olderback, 961 F.2d 756
(8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Averi, 922 F.2d 765 (11 th Cir. 1991) (per curiam);
United States v. Fonner, 920 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Duncan,
918 F.2d 647 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 177
(2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1989); United States
v. Dawn, 897 F.2d 1444 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Isom, 886 F.2d 736 (4th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1989) (per
curiam); United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604 (3d Cir. 1989). But see United States v.
Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 1991) (sentencing court not permitted to find
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facts that the jury had already considered and rejected reason
that the acquittal simply means that the state failed to prove the
conduct at issue beyond a reasonable doubt, but that it was still
permissible for a sentencing court to find, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the conduct existed.43 The strength of this
reasoning is considered below. For now, it is sufficient to point
out that, as a consequence of the courts' ability to second-guess
the jury, a defendant is tried twice for a given act: once by the
jury and once by the judge. Moreover, even if the defendant is
acquitted of certain charges at trial, the acquittal may be meaningless because punishment can be exactly what it would have
been had the defendant been convicted of the charges.44
II.

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE

DOUBT AND THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY

A.

Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
1. In re Winship's enunciation of the right to proof beyond
a reasonable doubt
"The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from
our early years as a Nation." '45 For most of our history, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard was assumed to be constitutionally required.4 6 In 1970, in the case of In re Winship,4 7 the
Supreme Court affirmed the long-standing assumption and "explicitly h[e]ld that the Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.' '48
The Winship Court explained that the reasonable doubt standard "is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions
resting on factual error."' 49 Because criminal convictions both
besmirch the defendant's good name and impose considerable
hardship, courts could not allow a conviction to befall an innothat defendant knowingly killed victim after jury acquitted defendant of that
charge).
43 See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
44 See id.
45 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).
46 See, e.g., Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910); Davis v. United
States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895); Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1880).
47 397 U.S. 358.
48 Id. at 364.
49 Id. at 363.
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cent person; and thus, to prevent that from happening, the Due
Process Clause required the State to surmount a high burden of
proof to secure a conviction. 50
2.

Mullaney and Patterson: development and confusion

The Court reiterated its analysis regarding the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard in Mullaney v. Wilbur.5 ' In Mullaney,
the Court struck down a Maine statute, providing that once the
State had demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the
criminal defendant had committed an intentional and unjustified
homicide, the criminal defendant could be convicted of murder
unless he then demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence
that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation, in
which case he would be guilty of the lesser crime of manslaughter. 52 While both murder and manslaughter were criminal acts,
the penalties for the two crimes were significantly different.5"
The disparity in the sentences, the Court held, meant that the
State could not shift the burden of proof to the defendant.5 4 The
Court held that the State bore the burden of proving that the
defendant did not act in the heat of passion or on sudden provocation if the State sought to have the defendant convicted of murder.5 5 Relying on the same calculation that it had employed in
Winship, the Mullaney Court observed:
[I]t is far worse to sentence one guilty only of manslaughter as
a murderer than to sentence a murderer for the lesser crime of
manslaughter. We therefore hold that the Due Process Clause
requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation
56
when the issue is properly presented in a homicide case.
Two years later, in Patterson v. New York, 5 7 the Court held that,
notwithstanding Mullaney, a New York law that required a defendant
50

Id. at 363-64 ("[A] society that values the good name and freedom of every

individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is
reasonable doubt about his guilt."). This point was emphasized by Justice Harlan
in his concurring opinion: "I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our
society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go
free." Id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).
51
52

53
54

421 U.S. 684 (1975).
Id. at 703.
Id. at 698.
Id.

55 Id. at 704.
56

Id. at 703-04 (citation omitted).

57 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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charged with murder to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance to reduce
the crime to manslaughter did not violate the Due Process Clause.5 8
In reaching this decision, the Court used a far different tone than it
had in Mullaney. Rather than analyzing the societal consequences of
the allocation of the burden of proof in criminal trials, the Court
deferentially stated that it would invalidate state criminal procedural
rules only in exceptional circumstances, because "preventing and
dealing with crime is much more the business of the States than it is
of the Federal Government."5 9 The Court also noted that there was
precedent for New York's allocation of the burden of proof - nineteenth century common law, for example, mandated that the burden
of proving the defense of heat of passion on sudden provocation
rested upon the defendant6" - and that it therefore did not " 'offend[] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions of conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' "61
Patterson acknowledged that "Mullaney surely held that a State
must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable
doubt."' 62 But, the Court in Patterson continued, Mullaney did not
hold that "the State may not permit the blameworthiness of an act
or the severity of punishment authorized for its commission to depend on the presence or absence of an identified fact without assuming the burden of proving the presence or absence of that fact,
as the case may be, beyond a reasonable doubt."-63 The Patterson
Court never explained what appears to be the crucial distinction between those facts that constitute the "ingredient[s] of an offense"
(Mullaney), and those facts upon which depend "the blameworthiness of an act or the severity of punishment authorized for its commission" (Patterson). The "ingredients of an offense" would appear
to consist of the precise factors that make a defendant's conduct
blameworthy or that sanction punishment, and Patterson's unexplained effort to draw a distinction between them was confusing. As
a consequence, following Patterson, the state of the law concerning
58
59

Id. at 201.
Id. (citing Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134 (1954) (plurality opinion)).

Id. at 202; see also id. at 208-09.
Id. at 202 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958)).
62 Id. at 215.
63 Id. at 214 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 214 n.15 ("There is some language
in Mullaney that has been understood as perhaps construing the Due Process Clause
to require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any fact affecting
'the degree of criminal culpability.'.. . The Court did not intend Mullaney to have
such far-reaching effect.").
60
61
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proof beyond a reasonable doubt was in disarray.'
3.

McMillan v. Pennsylvania and the uncertain scope of In
re Winship

Finally, in McMillan v. Pennsylvania,65 the Court upheld a portion of Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act
(MMSA) that provided that anyone convicted of enumerated
felonies was subject to a five-year mandatory minimum sentence
if the sentencing judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant "visibly possessed a firearm" during the
commission of the offense.6 6 As in Patterson, the Court emphasized that States have the primary responsibility for defining, regulating and punishing criminal activity;6 7 and, while recognizing
the possibility that a State's allocation of the burden of proof in a
criminal trial might run afoul of due process, the Court declined
to provide any illustrations or guidance concerning this theoretical possibility.6 8 Instead, the Court held that whatever else it did,
a State could not discard the presumption of innocence,6 9 and
that however onerous the State made sentencing provisions, such
provisions could not be "a tail which wags the dog of the sub70
stantive offense."
The Court concluded that the MMSA did not exceed either
of these limits. 7' It plainly did not contravene the first, and the
Court found that it did not violate the second, either. Of course,
because of the imprecision of the second standard, it is hard to
determine why the MMSA did not "wag the dog" of the substantive offense, or in what circumstances it might have. One hint of
64 See, e.g., Celia Goldwag, Note, The Constitutionality of Affirmative Defenses After
Patterson v. New York, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 655, 655 (1978) ("[T]he result in Patterson is explicable only if the Court intended to repudiate Mullaney.").
65 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
66 Id.
67 Id.

at 86 ("[W]e should hesitate to conclude that due process bars the State
from pursuing its chosen course in the area of defining crimes and prescribing
penalties.").
68 Id. ("[W]e have never attempted to define precisely the ... extent to which
due process forbids the reallocation or reduction of burdens of proof in criminal
cases, and do not do so today ....
");see also Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210 ("[T]here are
obviously constitutional limits [on the allocation of the burden of proof] beyond
which the States may not go ....").
69 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86-87.
70 Id. at 88.
71 Id. at 91 (acknowledging the Court's inability to set forth any "bright line"
test, but concluding that "[wie have no doubt that Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act falls on the permissible side of the constitutional line.").
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an answer was contained in the Court's observation that, because
several of the felonies to which the five-year mandatory minimum
applied subjected the defendant to a maximum of ten or twenty
years' imprisonment, the MMSA "operates solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range
already available to it .... 72 In other words, it may have been
important to the Court that the MMSA could not extend any defendant's maximum sentence, but could only increase the defendant's minimum sentence. The Court did not incorporate this
observation into its holding, and the import of the observation
was therefore unclear. This ambiguity, discussed below, has had
important consequences for the interpretation of McMillan.
B.

Trial by Jury

The right to a criminal jury trial has traditionally served
three principal goals. First, the jury expresses "the conscience of
the community," ' and thus invests the criminal law with a moral
force that it would not otherwise have. 7 " The Supreme Court has
emphasized that an important attribute of juries is "the community participation and shared responsibility that results from that
group's determination of guilt or innocence. '7 5 This is a benefit
shared by all of society, not simply the immediate participants in
any particular trial.
Second, the jury benefits defendants on trial by protecting
the defendant against the State, as represented by the prosecutor
and the judge. As Justice White explained in his often-cited
opinion for the Court in Duncan v. Louisiana:
A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order
to prevent oppression by the Government .... [P]roviding an
accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers [gives]
him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge .... [The right to a jury trial] reflect[s] a fundamental
decision about the exercise of official power - a reluctance to
entrust plenary powers over the life and
liberty of the citizen
76
to one judge or to a group of judges.
Id. at 88.
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 & n.15 (1968).
74 See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J.
1131, 1185-86 (1991); 1 ALEXIs DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 293-94
(Phillips Bradley ed., 1984) (1945).
75 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
76 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see also Amar, supra note 74, at 1186.
72
73
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Third, the jury benefits the jurors themselves, for each jury
serves as a school that trains its members to be good citizens. As
Justice Kennedy articulated in Powers v. Ohio:
The opportunity for ordinary citizens to participate in the administration of justice has long been recognized as one of the
principal justifications for retaining the jury system.... [W]ith
the exception of voting, for most citizens the honor and priviopportunity to parlege of jury duty is their most significant
77
process.
democratic
the
in
ticipate
Notwithstanding the considerable virtues of the constitutional
right to a jury, the Supreme Court has consistently held that juries
play no role in sentencing defendants. 7' The judge is responsible
for sentencing, and juries are instructed before they begin their deliberations that punishment is not their concern, and that they
should take no account of the potential punishment that a defendant
may receive if found guilty. 79 It is hard to square the jury's nonparticipation in sentencing with its role as a "conscience of the community." Punishment is unquestionably a moral concept, for it is an
act of retribution for the defendant's crime. It may thus appear
anomalous that the law so clearly demarcates the sentencing phase
of the trial as a territory into which the jury has no right to venture.
One explanation for the division of responsibilities is that
although sentencing involves retribution, it also serves other ends
- principally, the goals of general deterrence and rehabilitation that may be better served by a judicially-imposed sentence than by a
jury-imposed one. In particular, choosing a sentence in any case
requires consideration of a wide variety of facts beyond the jury's
attention. Juries are instructed to focus narrowly and determine the
facts relating to the particular crime charged in the indictment, but
the imposition of an appropriate sentence requires a broader focus.
Sentencing judges frequently consider, for example, a defendant's
criminal history, position in the community, family situation and
other "background facts" that are irrelevant to the crime of conviction, but that are relevant to the possible rehabilitative effect of any
punishment. As the Supreme Court explained:
In a trial before verdict the issue is whether the defendant is
77 Powers v. Ohio, I IIS. Ct. 1364, 1368, 1369 (1991) (citing Duncan, 391 U.S.
at 147-58, 187, 188)). See generally Amar, supra note 74, at 1186-89.
78 See, e.g., McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93 (1986) ("[T]here is no
Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the sentence turns on spe).
cific findings of fact ....
79 See, e.g., HON. LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., 1 MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
9.01 at 9-3 (1991).
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guilty of having engaged in certain criminal conduct of which
he has been specifically accused .... A sentencing judge, however, is not confined to the narrow issue of guilt. His task
within fixed statutory or constitutional limits is to determine
the type and extent of punishment after the issue of guilt has
been determined. Highly relevant - if not essential - to his
selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the
fullest information possible concerning the defendants's life
and characteristics. 8"
The only disputes in recent years concerning the role of juries
in sentencing defendants have arisen in capital cases.
Because
many states provide a statutory basis for jury participation in sentencing in capital cases, some people had argued that a defendant
had a constitutional right to a jury determination in the sentencing
phase of a capital trial. These arguments were silenced by Walton v.
Arizona, 8 ' in which the Court upheld an Arizona statute pursuant to
which a defendant who had been found guilty of first-degree murder
underwent a "sentencing hearing" in which the court, sitting without a jury, found certain statutorily-identified "aggravating factors"
were present, and thus imposed the death penalty. 8 2 Without these
aggravating factors - specifically, that the murder had been committed "in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner," and
that it had been committed for pecuniary gain - the defendant
would have been subject to a maximum penalty of twenty-five years
in prison.8 3 The defendant challenged the statute on the ground
that it violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.8 4 The
Court, however, brushed aside any suggestion or possibility left
open from previous cases that there was a right to a jury determination in the sentencing phase of capital cases. Relying on the line of
decisions holding that the jury determines guilt, not punishment,8 5
the Court found no reason to distinguish capital cases from others,
and ruled that " 'the Sixth Amendment does not require that the
specific findings authorizing the imposition of the sentence of death
be made by the jury.' "86 Walton thus makes clear that there is no
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-47 (1949) (footnote omitted).
110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990).
82 Id. at 3051-54.
83 Id. at 3052-53; see also id. at 3087 & n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84 Id. at 3054. The defendant also challenged the statute on Eighth Amendment
grounds, but the Court found that the statute did not violate the defendant's Eighth
Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. Id.at 3055.
85 Id. at 3054 (citing Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990)); Hildwin v.
Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984)).
86 Id. (quoting Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 640-41).
80
81
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Sixth Amendment limit on the distinction between, on the one
hand, elements of the crime and, on the other, factors relevant only
for sentencing purposes.8 7
III.

A

CRITIQUE OF THE MCMILLAN-WALTON DOCTRINE

McMillan and Walton represent the highwater mark of the
trend toward removing decisions that strongly affect criminal defendants from the jury and resolving them by a standard of less
than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. McMillan establishes the
due process limits on the definition of criminal activity and the
scope of sentencing facts. Walton demonstrates that there is no
Sixth Amendment limitation between criminal acts and sentencing facts. In light of McMillan and Walton, the current state of the
law with regard to criminal acts and sentencing facts may be
stated thus:
Congress or a state legislature has a free hand to determine
what constitutes both elements of a crime and "aggravating
factors" that affect sentencing except that (1) all defendants
must be presumed to be innocent, and (2) the "tail" of sentencing must not be allowed to "wag the dog" of the guiltdetermination phase of the trial.88
There are four problems with this approach, which I will call
the McMillan-Walton doctrine. First, the doctrine's imprecision has
led to an almost complete obliteration of the distinction between
criminal acts and sentencing facts. Second, this obliteration has led
to a devaluation of the role of the jury, which compromises the right
to ajury trial. Third, the McMillan-Walton doctrine relies unaccountably on a brand of literalism that is, in effect, an abdication of the
judicial role in constitutional interpretation. Finally, the McMillanWalton doctrine threatens the classical liberal notion of proportionality in punishment.
A.

Vagueness and the Slippery Slope

The first and most obvious problem with the McMillan-Walton doctrine is that it provides no meaningful guidance to the
lower courts. No state or federal law has ever abolished the presumption of innocence - the requirement that the state bear the
burden of proof in a criminal trial. Consequently, the first pro87 Although Walton deals specifically with the right to a jury determination in
death penalty cases, the breadth of its reasoning confirms that the jury has no role
in the sentencing phase of any cases.
88 See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
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viso of the McMillan test has virtually no practical import. The
second proviso of McMillan is so broadly stated and imprecise
that it is a nullity. It is impossible to define with any precision
when a statutory "dog" is wagged by its "tail"; the words simply
do not make sense.
Any legal standard is imprecise to some degree, and indeed,
sometimes ambiguity may serve a legitimate purpose. For example, ambiguity is useful when a court employs it to defer an issue
to allow events or parties' ideas to develop."' But the McMillanWalton doctrine's total lack of guidance to the lower courts serves
no such purpose. To the contrary, the imprecision of the McMillan-Walton doctrine does not affect all parties to the criminal process equally, but instead plainly works to the disadvantage of the
criminal defendant. As shown above, lower federal courts have
attached increasing importance to sentencing facts and less to
criminal acts.9 0 Given the freedom that McMillan-Walton gave the
lower courts, it was to be expected that they would interpret the
scope of sentencing facts broadly. The broader the scope of sentencing facts - and, the resultant narrower scope of criminal acts
the broader is the sentencing judge's power. One need not be
overly cynical to believe that courts, like most other people, prefer situations over which they have comparatively greater
control. 9 '
Given McMillan's vagueness, courts can accommodate McMillan to virtually any case before them to the disadvantage of
the criminal defendant. United States v. Young 9 2 provides a perfect
example. In Young, the defendant was accused of violating the

then-effective version of 18 U.S.C. § 111, which provided:
Whoever forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with [certain specified federal officials in
the course of their official duties] shall be fined not more than
$5,000, or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
Whoever, in the commission of such acts uses a deadly or dangerous weapon, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or im89 The Supreme Court's famous directive that certain school districts were to
desegregate "with all deliberate speed," Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,
301 (1955), may have been such an instance.
90 See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
91 It may be significant that numerous judges have expressed displeasure with
the constraints on their power imposed by the Guidelines. In light of this perceived
restriction on judges' powers, it is understandable that judges would tend to oppose other restraints, such as a narrower definition of sentencing facts.
92 936 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1991).
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prisoned not more than ten years, or both.93
The indictment referred only to the statute's first sentence - it did
not mention that the defendant used a deadly or dangerous weapon
and the jury was not instructed regarding the use of a deadly or
dangerous weapon.9 4 After the jury found the defendant guilty of
violating § I 11, however, the court found, in the sentencing phase
of the trial, that the defendant had used a deadly or dangerous
weapon in connection with his criminal acts, and thus sentenced him
under the second, more harsh portion of the statute.9 5
Relying solely on McMillan, the circuit court upheld the sentence against a due process challenge. The court, observing that
McMillan had not established any hard and fast rules governing the
distinction between criminal acts and sentencing facts,9 6 was unconstrained in conducting its brief analysis: the weapons provision of
§ I 11, the court asserted, "is not imbued with the constitutional accoutrements of an offense,"19 7 and thus was properly regarded as a
sentencing fact. The Young court recognized that § I l I went beyond the MMSA at issue in McMillan because § I ll (unlike the
MMSA) increased the defendant's sentence beyond the otherwise
applicable sentence range. 98 Again, the Young court took advantage
of the ambiguity of McMillan to slough off the difference: "Since
McMillan did not establish a 'bright line' rule, it is not particularly
relevant that the sentence for using a dangerous or deadly weapon
could exceed the 'normal' statutory maximum by up to seven
93 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1988 & Supp. 1992). The statute was amended on November 18, 1988 - after the date of the acts involved in Young - as follows:
(a) In general. - Whoever (1) forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates or
interferes with [certain specified people in the course of their official
duties]; or
(2) forcibly assaults or intimidates [certain other specified people in the course of their official duties] shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
(b) Enhanced penalty. - Whoever, in the commission of any acts
described in subsection (a), uses a deadly or dangerous weapon, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
both.
Id. The amendment thus resolves the question of statutory interpretation confronted by the Young court. It could not, of course, affect the constitutional analysis
of Young.
94 Young, 936 F.2d at 1053 n.4.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 1053-54.
97 Id. at 1055.
98 Id. at 1054-55.
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years."99

The Young court's analysis is unpersuasive. The bald assertion
that the weapons provision of the statute "is not imbued with constitutional accoutrements of an offense," is not a coherent rationale
for the court's holding; it is simply impossible to say what a "constitutional accoutrement" of an offense is. Moreover, the distinction
between § I ll in Young and the MMSA in McMillan should not have
been ignored with the observation that it is "not particularly relevant." Yet, Young's cursory treatment of the problem is almost understandable. Given the vagueness of the McMillan-Walton doctrine,
it is virtually impossible to assert cogent reasons for categorizing
something as a criminal act or a sentencing fact.
The danger of the slippery slope that the McMillan-Walton doctrine creates is that its consistent application would permit many
statutes that have hitherto been unquestionably interpreted as dealing with criminal acts as if they were merely sentencing-enhancement statutes. For example, the federal bank robbery law has always
treated armed bank robbery as a crime separate and distinct from
"regular" bank robbery, and provides a heavier penalty for armed
bank robbery."' Under McMillan and its progeny, however, there is
no reason why armed bank robbery could not cease to be considered separately and become a variant of bank robbery. Similarly, 18
U.S.C. § 924(c), which makes it a crime to "use or carry" a firearm
in connection with certain specified felonies, and which carries a
punishment of at least five years' imprisonment in addition to
whatever other punishment the defendant receives for the underlying, specified felonies,' 0 ' has always been considered a separate
crime, required to be presented to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. 0 2 Yet, under McMillan and its progeny, it is not at
all clear why § 924(c) could not be considered simply a sentencing
fact to be contemplated by a court following a trial.
99 Id. at 1055.
100 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1988 & Supp. 1992) (not more than $5000 fine

or twenty year prison term, or both, for bank robbery) with 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d)
(1988) (not more than $10,000 fine or twenty-five year prison term, or both, for
armed bank robbery).
101 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
102 See, e.g.,
United States v. Morehead, 959 F.2d 1489, 1501 n.4 (10th Cir. 1992)
(quoting United States v. Hunter, 887 F.2d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 1989) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1159 (1990)) ("It is well settled that 'Section
924(c)(1) defines a separate crime rather than merely enhancing the punishment
for other crimes.' ").
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The Discredited Role of the Jury

As demonstrated above, the right to a jury promotes three
goals for three separate beneficiaries: it protects the criminal defendant from the oppression of the State as embodied by the
prosecutor and the judge; it benefits the jurors themselves by
serving as a "school" for citizenship; and, it increases confidence
in the criminal justice system, which is a general benefit to society. ' 3 The McMillan-Walton doctrine hinders the promotion of
each of these goals.
First, because the McMillan-Walton doctrine does not demarcate any constitutional core of decisions that a jury must determine, the jury's role can be reduced to a minimum by a
legislature's definition of a crime. Therefore, the jury's determination is simply the first of several decisions that affect the defendant, rather than the authoritative voice of the community's
moral conscience; it is neither the decision most deeply imbued
with moral significance, nor necessarily the decision that has the
most practical importance for the defendant. Obviously, as the
jury's role lessens, the jury can no longer protect the defendant
as it was intended to do.
Second, the value of jury service for the jurors themselves
lies in the requirements that the jurors think analytically about
problems, discard prejudice and reflexive reactions and consider
carefully what has been proven as distinct from what has been
assumed. To the extent that the McMillan-Walton doctrine provides juries with fewer opportunities to engage in this exercise,
the doctrine makes jury service less of a "school for citizenship"
than it would otherwise be.
Walton itself aptly illustrates these two points. The question
that the sentencing judge was required to answer was whether
the acts for which Walton was convicted had been undertaken in
a "heinous, cruel or depraved manner."'' 0 4 Such a question is
preeminently a matter of community standards, morals and
norms. It is, in short, precisely the type of question on which the
voice of the community's moral authority would be most valuable. Yet, because of the standardless McMillan-Walton doctrine,
the jury was prevented from speaking on the matter.
Third, in addition to limiting the scope and importance of
the jury's verdict, and thus depriving both the defendant and the
103
104

See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3052 (1990).
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jurors themselves of the benefits of a jury trial, the McMillan-Walton doctrine undermines both the integrity of the verdict and,
consequently, public confidence in the criminal justice system.
Just as the McMillan- Walton doctrine permits the legislature to reduce almost without limits the factual disputes that the jury must
determine, it also permits the sentencing judge to reconsider factual determinations reached by the jury. In the most extreme
case, a judge who hears no evidence other than that presented to
the jury may make a finding contrary to what the jury found - as,
for example, cases in which a jury returns special verdicts concerning the amount of drugs and the sentencing judge makes a
contrary finding.'0 5 Indeed, an observer might well conclude
that the jury's deliberations were pointless.
One might acknowledge that the McMillan-Walton doctrine
affects the role of the jury in the ways that I have identified, but
argue that the diminished role of the jury is not something that
need worry us. After all, juries are often criticized for being inefficient and inaccurate - therefore, anything that limits their roles
is a positive good, not a reason for concern. The problem with
this view is that it is completely at odds with the jury system and
the important role that the jury plays in assuring society of the
appearance, as well as the fact, of justice. The Supreme Court
recently relied upon precisely these values in Powers v. Ohio.'1 6 In
Powers, the Court held that a white defendant had standing to object to the race-based exclusion of black prospective jurors. The
Powers Court stated:
The jury acts as a vital check against wrongful exercise of
power by the State and its prosecutors.... The purpose of the
jury system is to impress upon the criminal defendant and the
community as a whole that a verdict of conviction or acquittal
0 7
is given in accordance with the law by persons who are fair.'
Sentences that are based upon acts or factors for which the jury has
acquitted the defendant undermine the appearance of fairness. It
appears as if, by its sentence, the court is repudiating the jury's
judgment.
A further response might be that, because the court applies a
lesser standard of proof in the sentencing phase than the jury does
in the guilt-determination phase of the trial, there is no logical contradiction between the jury's verdict and the judge's decision. But
105
106
107

See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
Id. at 1371, 1372.
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the absence of a logical contradiction does not erase the strong appearance of repudiation. Most people recognize that the distinction
between the burdens of proof is not mathematically precise, and
thus would inevitably feel that the court, by finding facts differently
than the jurors, was "second guessing" the jury. The Ninth Circuit
noted this point in United States v. Brady.'
In Brady, the court held
-

contrary to several other circuits -

that a sentencing court could

not upwardly depart on the basis of factual findings that contradicted what the jury had found and that had led the jury to acquit
the defendant of certain charges.' 0 9 In support of its holding, the
Brady court relied on the strong appearance of injustice that would
result from an upward departure in these circumstances:
We would pervert our system ofjustice if we allowed a defendant to suffer punishment for a criminal charge for which he or
she was acquitted ....
A sentencing court should not be allowed to . . . mak[e] a finding of fact - under any standard of

proof - that the jury has necessarily rejected by its judgment
of acquittal. '0
The observations of Professor Charles Nesson in his article, The
Evidence or the Event? On JudicialProofand the Acceptability of Verdicts,"'
are apposite. Professor Nesson argued that an important function
of a trial is to make jury verdicts acceptable to the society at large by
safeguarding their reliability. In other words,jury verdicts are statements to the public of what actually happened at a particular time
and place. The criminal process takes great pains to make these
statements conservative and difficult to undermine.' ' 2 The acceptability of jury verdicts will be undermined and diminished precisely
to the extent that judge's sentencing determinations override a
jury's findings. If a sentencing court made a finding opposite to
what the jury found, explaining simply that it was using a different
burden of proof, it would hardly make jury verdicts widely accepted
as a statement regarding what happened at a particular time and
place.
The absence of the jury from sentencing decisions is particularly disturbing under the Guidelines, for the Guidelines make retribution rather than rehabilitation the predominant federal
108 928 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1991).
109 Id. at 851.

110 Id. (footnote omitted).
I 'I Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? OnJudicialProofand the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1985).
112 See id. at 1360-68.
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penological goal."' Retribution, as discussed above, is an expression of the society's anger and moral outrage. It is thus more appropriately the province of the jury rather than of the judge.
C.

The Failureof Literalism

Rather than draw a reasoned distinction between criminal
acts and sentencing facts, the McMillan-Walton doctrine relies
upon a brand of literalism that undermines the distinction and
precludes, as a practical matter, judicial review of critical legislative decisions.
The McMillan- Walton doctrine's most important factor in determining whether a fact is an element of an offense or a sentencing fact is how the state statute defines the offense. In Patterson,
for example, the Court observed that "[t]he applicability of the
reasonable-doubt standard . . . has always been dependent on
how a State defines the offense that is charged in any given
case[.]' "' 4 In McMillan itself, the Court stated that, "in determining what facts must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt[,]
the state legislature's definition of the elements of the offense is
usually dispositive[.]""' 5 In Walton, the Court accepted without
question the statutory distinction between elements of the offense and "aggravating factors."' 16
Allowing a state legislature to define an element of a crime
without any meaningful or clear judicial limitation is an abandonment of the Court's role as the authority on constitutional rights.
Marbury v. Madison firmly established that "[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to [slay what the law
is."1 17 The literalism of the McMillan-Walton doctrine cedes that
duty to the state legislature.
113 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (1988 & Supp. 1992). Compare Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-66 (1989) (retribution is the predominant penological
goal underlying the Guidelines) with Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248
(1949) (identifying rehabilitation as the predominant contemporary penological
goal).
114 Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 211 n.12 (1977).
115 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85 (1986).
116 Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3057-58 (1990).
117 1 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct.
2680, 2713 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe suggestion that a legislatively
mandated punishment is necessarily 'legal' is the antithesis of the principles established by Marbury v. Madison, . . . for '[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is,' .....
and to determine whether a
legislative enactment is consistent with the Constitution."). In Harmelin, the Court
considered whether a Michigan statutory scheme of punishment violated the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 2684.
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The Court's reliance on the legislature's definitions and labels for its determination of the extent of constitutional protections is contrary to the Supreme Court's refusal, expressed
elsewhere, to rely on legislative labels. In United States v.
Halper," 8 for example, the Supreme Court held that the Double
Jeopardy Clause may bar a civil action seeking punitive damages
if there has already been a criminal prosecution against the defendant." 9 The Court declined the Government's invitation to
hold that civil proceedings do not implicate the Double Jeopardy
Clause simply because they are, by definition, civil:
The notion of punishment, as we commonly understand it,
cuts across the division between the civil and the criminal law,
and for the purposes of assessing whether a given sanction
constitutes multiple punishment barred by the Double 20
Jeopardy Clause, we must follow the notion where it leads.'
Similarly, the fact that a state does not label an act or circumstance
an element of the crime ought not be controlling for constitutional
analysis. 121
The Court has justified its reluctance to overturn the states' allocations between criminal acts and sentencing facts by reference to
its concern for federalism. 1 22 But such forbearance is ill-advised.
Although it is correct that substantive criminal law is principally the
province of the states, not of the federal government, this principle
arises from a concern that the federal government would be too op12 3
pressive if it took a leading role in sanctioning criminal conduct.
118 490 U.S. 435
119 Id. at 446-51.

(1989).

120 Id. at 447-48 (quoting Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631 (1988) ("[T]he labels affixed either to the proceeding or to the relief imposed.., are not controlling
and will not be allowed to defeat the applicable protections of federal constitutional
law.")).
121 Somewhat incongruously, the Court has seemed less attentive to the problem
of literalism than has Congress. In the debate concerning what became 18 U.S.C.
§ 3579(a) - the federal criminal restitution statute - the House Report observed
that there were constitutional limits on restitution that could be ordered by a court:
"To order a defendant to make restitution to a victim of an offense for which the
defendant was not convicted would be to deprive the defendant of property without
due process of law." H.R. REP. No. 99-334, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1985) (citing
to H.R. REP. No. 98-1017, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 n.43 (1984)) (quoted in Hughey
v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 1979, 1985 n. 5 (1990)). Unlike the Court, Congress, at
least in this instance, appeared to appreciate that there are constitutional limits on
the definitions of crimes and attributions of punishments.
122 See, e.g., McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (quoting Patterson
v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977)) ("preventing and dealing with crime is
much more the business of the States than it is of the Federal Government .... ").
123 See, e.g., Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 89 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Law enforcement remains, and should remain, the primary responsibility of
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Such a concern for federalism does not mean, however, - indeed,
cannot mean - that the federal judiciary cannot prescribe constitutional boundaries within which state legislatures may act. While the
concern for federalism operates as a restraint on Congress, and may
influence the federal judiciary's interpretation of federal criminal
statutes,12 4 it in no way implies that federal courts must tread lightly
in applying constitutional principles that protect individual rights
under state criminal statutes.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's "tail wags the dog" rule hardly
seems the best way to avoid federal judicial intervention in state
criminal procedures. The ambiguity of that rule invites federal constitutional challenges to state practices. A clearer rule, even if more
restrictive of state practices, might reduce federal intervention over1 25
all - and thus better serve the goals of federalism.
Finally, the concern for federalism ought not affect the judiciary's consideration offederal statutes or the Guidelines. Thus, to the
extent that the concern for federalism led the Patterson, McMillan
and Walton Courts to defer entirely to the legislative definition of
criminal acts, that concern is not present where federal statutes or
the Guidelines are at issue. Significantly, though, the lower federal
courts have applied McMillan to their analyses of federal criminal
statutes and the Guidelines. 1 26 Their willingness to do so demonstrates that they are unpersuaded by the Supreme Court's federalism rationale.
the several States. Every increase in the power of the federal prosecutor moves us a
step closer to a national police force with its attendant threats to individual
liberty.").

124 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (because law enforcement is principally the job of
the States, "we have a special obligation to make sure that Congress intended to
authorize a novel assertion of federal criminal jurisdiction"); see also United States v.

Capano, 786 F.2d 122, 128 (3d Cir. 1986) (it is Congress's duty to define the scope
of criminal conduct).

125 Similar considerations influenced the Supreme Court to adopt a relatively
bright-line test regarding under what circumstances a criminal defendant had a

right to counsel. Prior to Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which estab-

lished that defendants had a right to appointed counsel in all criminal prosecutions,
the rule was that defendants had a right to appointed counsel only if such appointment was required to avoid "a denial of fundamental fairness." Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455, 462 (1942). Although the earlier standard was intended, in part, to provide room for the states to develop their own practices, the Gideon Court noted that

the vagueness of the old rule had led to numerous, intrusive federal appeals to state
proceedings, and expressed the hope that the bright-line rule it announced would
reduce the number of such appeals. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337-38 & n.2.
126 See, e.g., United States v. Young, 936 F.2d 1050, 1053-55 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying McMillan to analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 111); United States v. Underwood, 932
F.2d 1049, 1053-55 (2d Cir. 1991) (applying McMillan to analysis of Sentencing

Guidelines).
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The Decline of the Liberal Ideal of Punishment

Our legal system is predicated on the assumption that, in
most instances, individuals can make free and rational choices,
and are responsible for the foreseeable consequences of those
choices. The assumption of individual autonomy is a predicate
underlying the liberal political tradition from which the American
common and constitutional law developed. The predominance
of sentencing facts undermines the legal system's respect for individual autonomy in two ways.
First, defendants may not know what sentence they will receive if they plead guilty or are convicted at trial; they thus cannot make intelligent decisions about whether to go to trial. For
example, the predominance of relevant conduct under the
Guidelines allows the Government "to indict for less serious offenses which are easy to prove and then expand them in the probation office."' 2 7 Thus, prior to pleading to or being found
guilty of the charges in an indictment, a defendant cannot know
whether he will be sentenced upon only the acts specified in the
indictment, or on some additional relevant conduct about which
he has not been put on notice. For example, a defendant
charged with conspiracy to distribute heroin may not know because the indictment need not specify - whether it will be alleged that the conspired distribution involved a gram of heroin
or a kilogram. Obviously such information would make a tremendous difference concerning the penalty that the defendant
may face, and to the defendant's decision to plead or go to trial.
Indeed, even when the defendant pleads, he is not required to be
informed how the Guidelines may apply to his case; therefore, he
may still be in the dark regarding the sentence that he will receive.2 Because the defendant cannot know the consequences
of his actions, he cannot exercise his autonomy effectively.
The predominance of sentencing facts further undermines
the legal system's respect for individual autonomy because it
changes the character of the sentence that criminal defendants
127 United States v. Ebbole, 917 F.2d 1495, 1501 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting United
States v. Miller, 910 F.2d 1321, 1332 (Merritt, C.J., dissenting)); see also United
States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1121 (3d Cir. 1990) (Rosenn, J., concurring)
(suggesting that prosecution deliberately saved proof of the defendant's intent for
the sentencing hearing).
128 See United States v. Pimentel, 932 F.2d 1029, 1032 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding
that defendants have no due process right to know how the Guidelines may apply in
their case, but acknowledging that defendants have been unfairly surprised by the
application of the Guidelines in many cases).
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receive. A corollary of the traditional liberal account of sentencing is that the punishment must "fit" the crime, that is, be proportional to it.' 29 The danger posed by the McMillan-Walton
doctrine in this context is that, to the extent that the sentence is
determined on the basis of sentencing facts rather than criminal
acts, the sentence is no longer specifically a punishment for the
defendant's criminal behavior. Instead, the sentence is a response to a set of circumstances or a pattern of behavior - relevant conduct - that may never have been presented to the
jury,' 30 that the defendant may not have had an adequate opportunity to rebut13 ' or that may not even be criminal.13 2 Additionally, as noted above, a sentence may depend far more on the
defendant's relevant conduct than on the crime for which the defendant has been found guilty. The crime thus becomes simply
the occasion for the sentence rather than the reason for it, and the
punishment may no longer fit the crime because it is no longer
delineated by the crime.
One response is that, so long as a defendant cannot be punished in an amount greater than the statutory maximum, the punishment always fits the crime, and the crime is always the reason
for the punishment. But this response is unconvincing: it is wellestablished that a defendant's punishment may be greater because of relevant conduct than it would otherwise be. It is simply
absurd to state that defendants are punished solely for their
crime, without regard for relevant conduct.
129 See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983) (upholding proportionality review as an inherent part of Eighth Amendment analysis, and noting that "[t]he
principle that a punishment should be proportionate to the crime is deeply rooted
and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence"). The principle of proportionality was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court over the vigorous protest of
Justice Scalia. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991); see also Thompson
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 834 (1988) (plurality opinion) (quoting California v.
Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'ConnorJ., concurring)) ("punishment should
be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant"); Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) ("The heart of the retribution rationale is that a
criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal
offender."); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 825 (1982)(O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("proportionality requires a nexus between the punishment imposed and the defendant's blameworthiness").
130 See supra text accompanying notes 26-36.
131 See id.
132 See United States v. Newbert, 952 F.2d 281, 284 (9th Cir. 1991) (conduct that
does not violate federal law may be "relevant conduct"); United States v. Uccio,
940 F.2d 753, 759 (2d Cir. 1991) (conduct that does not violate federal criminal law
may be the basis for an upward departure); United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d
1084, 1105 n.26 (3d Cir. 1990) (intent to commit murder, while not a federal offense, may nonetheless be taken into account for sentencing purposes).
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Another response is that, in the federal penal system, punishment has never been a response solely to the crime of which a
defendant has been convicted. Punishment has always served
several purposes - retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation and has therefore depended upon the defendant's "life and characteristics.""' Consequently, the objections raised to the McMilIan-Walton doctrine may be levelled against any system of
sentencing in which the defendant's background is taken into
account.
While this response has some force, the "other" factors considered by judges in meting out punishment have historically
been relatively unimportant compared to the crime itself, and
often uncontested. For example, while a criminal's family situation and prior criminal record were always relevant to sentencing, they were usually conceded because they could be easily
established through conventional means. In such circumstances,
it would be fair to assume that a substantial portion of the defendant's punishment was based on the crime for which the defendant had been found guilty. By contrast, relevant conduct
may, as seen above, dwarf the crime of conviction in importance,
and it is often sharply contested. In precisely such a circumstance, it is inaccurate to maintain that the substantial portion of
the defendant's punishment was due to her crime.

IV.

THREE PROPOSALS FOR DRAWING A DISTINCTION BETWEEN
CRIMINAL ACTS AND SENTENCING FACTS

A.

Clear and Convincing Evidence: The Middle Ground

One commentator, addressing the due process problems
discussed in this Article, has argued that a sentencing court
should be required to find sentencing facts that tend to enhance
1 4
a defendant's sentence by "clear and convincing evidence."'
The clear and convincing standard is an intermediate ground between the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, used in the guilt
phase of the trial, and the preponderance of the evidence standard currently employed to determine sentencing facts.' 3 5 According to this commentator, the clear and convincing standard
"is the appropriate burden of proof ... because it effectively bal133 See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
134 Richard Husseini, Comment, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Adopting Clear
and Convincing Evidence as the Burden of Proof, 57 U. Ci. L. REV. 1387 (1990).
135 Id. at 1406; see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979) (referring to
clear and convincing evidence as the "middle level of burden of proof").
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the defendant against the relevant governances the interests 13of
6
mental concerns."

The clear and convincing standard is not, however, the solution, for it fails to address many of the problems identified above.
Most important, it does nothing to prevent the "slippage" between the categories of criminal acts and sentencing facts. As the
commentator recognizes, "at sentencing [under the Guidelines],
the judge must resolve factual issues that expose the defendant
to greater punishment, which essentially become elements of the crime,

and which may in effect evade Winship."' 7 This is precisely correct, yet the imposition of the clear and convincing standard for
sentencing facts does nothing to stop this evasion. What is
needed is a clear definition of what facts can be sentencing facts
and what facts must be elements of the offense, i.e., found by a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Moreover, the clear and convincing evidence standard relies
upon the false premise that "the concern about erroneous deprivation [of liberty] at sentencing is not as great as it is at trial,
because the defendant has already been found guilty."' 3 8 This
premise is false because the range of sentences that a defendant
may receive after being found guilty is so great. As discussed
above, a defendant found guilty of a drug-related offense may
face no time in jail or life imprisonment, depending upon the
quantity of drugs involved.' 39 Obviously the determination of
the quantity of drugs for which a defendant will be held responsible matters every bit as much as the question of guilt. Moreover,
that a person has been found guilty of a crime does not rob that
person of all vestiges of a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Indeed, "[u]nder our system of criminal justice even a thief
is entitled to complain that he has been unconstitutionally convicted and imprisoned as a burglar,"'14 and no convicted person
should be punished for more criminal activity than has been
proven.4'
Husseini, supra note 134, at 1410-11.
Id. at 1410 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Id. at 1408 (footnote omitted).
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
140 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 323-24 (1979).
141 At least two courts of appeals have considered whether the clear and convincing standard should be applied in sentencing hearings. In United States v.
Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990), the Third Circuit articulated:
We recognize that there is overwhelming authority in our sister circuits for the proposition that guideline sentencing factors need only
but we note that in
be proven by a preponderance of evidence ....
136

137
138
139
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The Greater Includes the Lesser

A more sophisticated alternative to the Supreme Court's approach begins with the observation that a criminal statute that
imposes a fixed term of punishment, such as the current statutory
maximum, for any violators of the statute, would not be unconstitutional. 4 Given that a legislature could pass such a fixed-term
statute, the argument proceeds, flexible statutes, which provide a
sentencing range rather than a single mandatory sentence, could
only benefit defendants, and if a fixed-term statute would be constitutional, then a flexible one must also be. In other words, the
constitutionality of the greater punishment assures the constitutionality of the lesser one. Thus, because a flexible-term statute
provides the defendant with a benefit not required by the Constitution, there is no due process right to have the benefit provided

in any particular way. 143

This argument - which I will call the "greater-includes-thelesser argument" - supports McMillan's observation that the
MMSA "operates solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion
none of these cases did the operative facts involve anything remotely
resembling a twelve-fold, 330-month departure from the median of an
applicable guideline range. We hold that the clear and convincing
standard is,under these circumstances, implicit in the statutory requirement that a sentencing court "find" certain considerations in order to justify a departure . . . and we reserve judgment on the

question whether it is also implicit in the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause
itself.
United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1102 (3d Cir. 1990). The Circuit Court
for the District of Columbia has recently refused to require application of the clear
and convincing standard, but held open the possibility that it might do so in the
future. United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 966 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also
United States v. Townley, 929 F.2d 365, 369-70 (8th Cir. 1991) ("We do not foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional case ... the clear and convincing standard adopted by [the Third Circuit] might apply.") The Supreme Court denied
certiorari in a case that might have presented the issue, Kinder v. United States,
112 S.Ct. 2290 (1992), over a dissent by Justice White. Justice White stated:
The burden of proof at sentencing proceedings is an issue of daily
importance to the district courts, with implications for all sentencing
findings, whether they be the base offense level, specific offense characteristics, or any adjustments thereto .... I would grant certiorari to
clarify the applicable standards under the new sentencing regime.
Kinder v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 2290, 2292 (1992)(White, J. dissenting).
142 Of course, it might be so high a penalty that a court would find it to be cruel
and unusual and thus a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Given the current
state of the law in that area, however, see Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S.Ct. 2680
(1991), such a finding would be most unlikely.
143 See Ronald J. Allen, The Restoration of In re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of
Persuasionin Criminal Cases after Patterson v. New York, 76 MicH. L. REV. 30 (1977).
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in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it."' 4 4
According to this argument, so long as sentencing facts do not
subject the defendant to punishment greater than the maximum
that the defendant could theoretically have received without regard
to sentencing facts, there is no constitutional problem.
This greater-includes-the-lesser argument is an improvement over the clear and convincing standard approach just discussed for, unlike that approach, it in fact does draw a line
between criminal acts and sentencing facts, namely, criminal acts
are those acts necessary to justify a maximum sentence as defined
by statute, whereas sentencing facts are any facts that serve to fix
the sentence below the maximum. The greater-includes-thelesser argument cannot, however, justify cases like Walton v. Arizona and United States v. Young, in which the enhanced penalty exceeded that which could have been imposed in the "normal" case
without the enhancement. Thus, the argument does not support
the existing state of the law, and would actually require some limitation of it.
Notwithstanding its superiority over the clear and convincing standard approach, the greater-includes-the-lesser argument
is not satisfactory for two reasons. First, although it attempts to
respond to the due process problems considered here, it says
nothing about the Court's evisceration of the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial. Under the greater-includes-thelesser approach, a court could still "second guess" the jury's resolution of any factual determination that was both a criminal act
and a sentencing fact, and thus undermine public confidence in
the jury's deliberations. Moreover, this approach would still permit legislatures to define crimes narrowly, thereby limiting severely the facts that will be determined by the jury, with high
maximum penalties. Thus, it would continue to move the onus
of the trial to the sentencing stage, where the sentencing judge
would evaluate evidence about a great many sentencing facts to
determine where within the statutory range to sentence the defendant. Because there would be so much more at stake in the
sentencing stage than in the criminal prosecution itself, the benefits received by both the defendant and the jurors in any jury trial
would be severely limited.
Second, the greater-includes-the-lesser argument is simply a
reiteration of the now-discredited distinction between rights and
144 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986).
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privileges.' 45 According to the argument, the defendant has a
right to be sentenced at no greater than the maximum imposed by
the statute and, although the defendant may have a privilege created by the Guidelines or other statutory terms to be sentenced
at something below the maximum, that privilege can be conditioned in any way that the Government wishes, including the
presence vel non of specified sentencing facts that are determined
during the sentencing phase of the trial.
The application of right-privilege analysis to criminal sentencing, however, is inappropriate. Crucial to the development
of the right-privilege distinction was that it related not to rights
traditionally protected by the government, but to the conferral of
non-traditional benefits - including welfare benefits and other
elements of the "new property"' 4 6 by the Government.' 4 7
Criminal sentencing, however, deals not with property rights, but
with liberty interests, which were never part of the "new property," and have not traditionally been, nor should they be, subject to right-privilege analysis.
The Guidelines and other statutory terms confer something
more than a privilege on the criminal defendant. More accurately, they confer a liberty interest that is entitled to due process
protection. 4 8 Whether a defendant has a constitutionally protected liberty interest depends upon the degree to which the government's discretion to take away that liberty is constrained. In
Board of Pardons v. Allen,' 4 9 for example, the Court held that a
Montana parole release statute created a liberty interest because
it required that the inmates to whom it applied be released on parole so long as certain designated findings were made.' 50 Similarly, in Wolffv. McDonnell,' 5 ' the Court found that inmates had a
liberty interest, entitled to due process protection, in "good
time" calculations where prison regulations created a right to
good time that could be forfeited only for specified "serious
145 For a good discussion of the right-privilege distinction, see Rodney A. Smolla,
The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1982).
146 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
147 See Smolla, supra note 145, at 78.
148 Much of the reasoning in this and the following paragraphs is derived from
Judge Norris's opinion in United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1991)
(en banc) (Norris, J., dissenting).
149 482 U.S. 369 (1987).
150 Id. at 375, 377-78.
151 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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152

The Guidelines and sentencing statutes under consideration
here work the same way, for they set forth the precise extent to
which defendants shall lose their liberty if certain facts are found.
On account of the lack of governmental discretion, defendants
have constitutionally protected liberty interests in that factual
finding.
Although no case has held that the Guidelines create a liberty interest protected by due process constraints, the opinion of
Justice Souter in Burns v. United States 5 ' provides persuasive authority for that view. Burns raised the question of whether the
sentencing court was required to give the defendant notice of its
intention to depart upwardly from the presumptively applicable
Guideline range. The majority of the Court held that Rule 32 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure required such notice.' 5 4
Justice Souter, however, found that there was no such requirement in Rule 32'-" and therefore considered whether it would
violate the defendant's constitutional rights for the sentencing
court to depart upwardly from the presumptively applicable
Guideline range without giving the defendant prior notice. In
the course of his opinion, Justice Souter, analyzing the relevant
precedents regarding the creation of liberty interests, observed
that because the Guidelines spoke in mandatory terms - they
provided that the defendant shall receive a certain sentence if certain conditions were met, at least in most circumstances - and
concluded that the defendant had a liberty interest subject to due
process protection in receiving the presumptively applicable
sentence:
The [Guidelines] . .. provid[e] that "[t]he court shall impose a
sentence of the kind, and within the range [set forth by the
Guidelines,] unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission." . . . I therefore conclude that a defendant enjoys an
expectation subject to due process protection that he will receive a sentence within the presumptively applicable range in
the absence of grounds defined by the [Guidelines] as justifying departure.' 5 6
152

Id. at 557.

153 111 S. Ct. 2182 (1991).
154 Id. at 2187.
155 Id. at 2188 (Souter, j., dissenting).
156

Id. at 2192 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Souter went on

1993]

CRIMINAL SENTENCING

495

Although Justice Souter's observations came in the context of upward departures, their import is broader. Given that a defendant
has a liberty interest, protectible by the Due Process Clause, in a
sentence "within the presumptively applicable range," it follows
that the defendant has a right to have that range calculated by pro57
cedures that meet due process scrutiny.'
Advocates of the greater-includes-the-lesser argument might
concede that a criminal defendant has a liberty interest in a sentence
within the presumptively applicable range, but ask the question:
even if a defendant is entitled to due process, what process is due?
More particularly, does the use by the sentencing court of the preponderance of the evidence standard adequately protect the defendant's liberty interest, or is the more exacting, beyond a reasonable
doubt standard required?
The answer is that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is
necessary to adequately protect the defendant's liberty interests. To
demonstrate that this is so, one must balance the defendant's liberty
interests against society's interests, and the dangers of erroneous
factual determinations. 5 8 Considering first the defendant's interest
to find that there were adequate protections of a defendant's sentence so that the
lack of notice did not violate the defendant's right to due process. Id. at 2195-96
(Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter was joined in his opinion by Justices White
and O'Connor. Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in part, but did not join in Justice
Souter's due process analysis. The majority of the Court, although it did not reach
the constitutional question addressed by Justice Souter, indicated that had it interpreted Rule 32 differently, it would probably have agreed that there was a liberty
interest entitled to due process protection in the sentencing phase of the trial. Id. at
2187. The Court suggested that if it had interpreted Rule 32 as not requiring notice of a sentencing court's intention to depart upwardly, it would have raised the
"serious question whether notice in this setting is mandated by the Due Process
Clause." Id.
157 As noted above, no court has held that there is a due process right to a sentence within the presumptively applicable range. Two powerful dissents, however,
have made the argument. See United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 669-72 (9th
Cir. 1991) (Norris,J., dissenting) (en banc) (arguing along the lines discussed here);
United States v. Lawrence, 918 F.2d 68 (8th Cir. 1990) (Bright,J., dissenting) (concluding that the Guideline "give convicted defendants a protected liberty interest
to a sentence within the Guidelines range appropriate for their conduct and
circumstances.").
158 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct.
2572 (1992), the Supreme Court held that "the Mathews balancing test does not
provide the appropriate framework for assessing the validity of state procedural
rules which, like the one at bar, are part of the criminal process." Id. at 2576. Medina involved the constitutionality of requiring the defendant in a state criminal
proceeding to bear the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, his
incompetence to stand trial. The proper question, the Court stated, was not
whether such an allocation of the burden of proof satisfied the Mathews standard,
but, following Patterson v. New York, whether it .'offend[ed] some principle ofjustice
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in liberty:
The importance of the liberty interest at stake need not be
labored. As Justice Souter put it in Burns, "The defendant's
interest in receiving a sentence not unlawfully higher than the
upper limit of the guideline range is . . .clearly substantial."

• .. Under the Guidelines, then, a defendant's stake in accurate factfinding at sentencing may be as great as his stake in
accurate factfinding at trial.' 59
Of course, the importance of the defendant's liberty interest at stake
in sentencing is a direct consequence of the wide range of sentences
that the defendant might typically receive. If the range were more
constrained - if more of the factual determinations relevant to sentencing were determined at trial - then the defendant would have a
substantially smaller liberty interest in the sentencing proceeding,
simply because the range of error could not be as great.
Society's interest in the sentencing procedure is not entirely opposed to the defendant's interest. On the one hand, society has no
interest in sentencing a defendant to a longer term than deserved
on the basis of incorrect information; thus society would prefer a
beyond a reasonable doubt standard to pertain even at a sentencing
hearing to avoid erroneous deprivations of liberty.' 60 On the other
hand, society also has an interest in making an efficient sentencing
process' 6 ' and, arguably, a higher standard of proof impairs the efficiency of the process. Thus, on the basis of efficiency, one might
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."' Id. at 2577 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 423 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)).
By its terms, Medina is limited to the analysis of state procedural rules; it has no
application to analysis of federal sentencing procedures. Thus, the Mathews analysis in the text is still relevant to federal proceedings. Moreover, the twin premises
of Medina were that (i) the only constitutional right arguably infringed by the challenged procedure was the defendant's right to due process, and (ii) " '[b]eyond the
specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause has
limited operation.' " Id. at 2576 (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342,
352 (1990)). In the sentencing context, however, I have argued that the defendant's due process right and his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial may be infringed by
certain sentencing procedures. Thus, the premises in Medina that led the Court to
abandon Mathews and adopt a less stringent constitutional test for state criminal
procedures are absent here. Finally, Medina criticized, but did not overturn, previous decisions in which the Court had plainly used the Mathews test in analyzing
challenged state criminal procedures. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985);
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980). The extent of the Medina holding is
thus open to question.
159 Restrepo, 946 F.2d at 674 (citations omitted) (Norris, J., dissenting).
160 See id
161 See United States v. Guerra, 888 F.2d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 1989) (expressing
concern about turning the sentencing hearing into a "second trial"), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 1833 (1990).
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argue that the preponderance of the evidence standard provides
sufficient protection of the defendant's right to due process in the
sentencing stage of the criminal process.
The efficiency argument against the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard is ultimately unpersuasive. The dangers of error at sentencing are substantial. As noted above, many constitutional rights
that defendants have at trial and that are intended to assure the accuracy of the fact-finding trial process - including the rights to confrontation and compulsory process - are not available at sentencing hearings. 6 ' Sentencing courts proceed on the basis of
affidavits, hearsay, estimates and "anything other than 'misinformation of constitutional magnitude.' ,163 Moreover, it has been reported that most of the inaccuracies tend to work to the defendant's
detriment, principally because of the disparity of resources typically
available to the government and the defendant.' 64 According to a
federal judge:
The probation officer ordinarily undertakes no independent
investigation of the facts and interviews no witnesses. Instead,
the probation officer relies almost exclusively on the government-provided information, a dependency reflecting the resource limitations of the probation office. Clearly, in practice,
the prosecutors control the ultimate judicial finding of
facts.... As one probation officer summarized, "we basically
16 5
rely on what the prosecutors and investigators give us.
Whether or not the probation office relies exclusively on the government's files in all cases, errors obviously benefit neither society
at large nor the defendant, and the high rate of errors suggests the
need for a higher standard of proof.
See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
Jones v. Thieret, 846 F.2d 457, 461 (7th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v.
Tucker, 404 U.S. 443,447 (1972)). Seealso United States v.Jacobs, 955 F.2d 7, 9-10
(2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam) ("reliable new evidence" may be used by sentencing
judge to support sentence); United States v. Pirre, 927 F.2d 694, 695-96 (2d Cir.
1991) (sentencing judge's use of chemist's findings made after conviction did not
constitute error).
164 See Note, An Argument for Confrontation under the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1886 (1992); Peter B. Pope, Note, How Unreliable Factfinding
Can Undermine Sentencing Guidelines, 95 YALE L.J. 1258, 1275-77 (1986).
165 Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161, 173 (1991) (quoting an Interview with a United States Probation Officer on October 22, 1990); see also United States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d
956, 966 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Edwards, J., concurring) ("It appears there may be
situations, for instance, where a Probation Officer will contact a [federal prosecutor] in advance of writing a Presentence Report and ask 'how much of a [downward] departure do you want in this case?' The Report is then written
accordingly.").
162
163
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Finally, there is probably not a great difference in the cost to
society of adjudication under the two standards of proof. Although
a preponderance of the evidence standard currently prevails at sentencing hearings, protracted and adversarial hearings are already
common. Insisting upon a higher burden of proof would not, therefore, effect any exceedingly costly change in procedure; it would
simply insist that the existing procedure be more accurate.
C. Justice Stevens's Solution: Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinions in McMillan and
Walton, set forth a superior method of distinguishing criminal
acts from sentencing facts.
In McMillan, Justice Stevens reasoned that the foundation
underlying the beyond a reasonable doubt rule was the judgment
that a person should not suffer the stigma and loss of liberty that
a criminal conviction and sentence entail unless culpability is
clearly demonstrated, or in other words, proven beyond a reasonable doubt.166 According to Justice Stevens, "In re Winship...
took a purposive approach to the constitutional standard of
proof: when the State threatens to stigmatize or incarcerate an
individual for engaging in prohibited conduct, it may do so only
if it proves the elements of the prohibited transaction beyond a
reasonable doubt." 167 The appropriate rule for determining
what facts must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and what
facts need not be, could be derived from the purpose of the beyond a reasonable doubt rule:
[I]f a State provides that a specific component of a prohibited
transaction shall give rise both to a special stigma and to a
special punishment, that component must be treated as a "fact
necessary to constitute the crime," within the meaning of our
holding in In168
re Winship [i.e., must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt].
Justice Stevens elaborated on this approach in his dissenting
opinion in Walton. There, he reviewed briefly the importance that
the Court had attributed to the jury's role in the criminal process.
Most importantly, the Justice focused on the jury's historic role as a
protector against arbitrary and oppressive action by the State, acting
166 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 97 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970)).
167 Id. at 98 (footnote omitted) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168 Id. at 103 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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through the judge. 69 The Justice decried how the Court, in recent
decisions (including McMillan),'70 had eviscerated the jury's role:
"By stretching the limits of sentencing determinations that are made
by judges... these decisions have encroached upon the factfinding
function that has so long been entrusted to thejury."'' The Walton
decision, Justice Stevens argued, "[f]urther distort[s] the sentencing
function,"172 and contributes to " 'the utter disuse of juries in questions of the most momentous concern.' ",173
Justice Stevens's proposed test would require the government
to prove to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt any fact relating to a
"prohibited transaction" that "give[s] rise both to a special stigma
and to a special punishment."' 7 4 Before evaluating this proposed
test, it is necessary to elaborate on it and explicate certain of its
parts.
The first point that requires elaboration is the definition of a
"prohibited transaction." This is important because, under any sentencing system that seeks to accomplish the various goals that the
federal system does (retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation),
sentencing judges must be permitted to take into account some facts
other than those directly related to a defendant's criminal acts - for
example, the defendant's criminal history, 1 75 and whether the defendant has expressed contrition for the crime.1 76 Thus, we could
not permit a standard that tied a sentencing judge's hands by requiring a jury to find all facts relevant to a defendant's sentence. Alternatively, "prohibited transaction" must be given a meaning
independent of any statutory definitions; otherwise, Justice Stevens's standard would fall into the literalism trap of the McMillanWalton doctrine. In other words, if the "prohibited transaction" was
coterminous with the crime that the legislature proscribed, then the
169 Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3088-89 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Much of this portion of Justice Stevens's opinion was devoted to quotations from
Justice White's opinion for the Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
Justice Stevens's choice of quotations was sharply pointed: Justice White authored
the majority opinion in Walton.
170 Justice Stevens also cited Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), which held
that a death sentence may be imposed by a judge rather than a jury.
171 Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3089 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
172
173

Id.

Id. at 3089 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 343-44 (1769)).
174 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 103 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175 The Guidelines, as well as virtually every other sentencing scheme, take criminal history into account.
176 Once again, the Guidelines expressly take into consideration whether a defendant accepts responsibility for committing a crime.
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legislature could easily avoid Justice Stevens's standard by defining
the crime very narrowly. Thus, a defendant whom the Government
suspects of engaging in numerous, large, difficult to prove narcotics
transactions in a short period of time could be charged with a single,
easy to prove small sale. After the defendant was convicted of that
simple crime, the sentencing court could increase the defendant's
sentence on the grounds of the other transactions, which would, by
definition, not be part of the "prohibited transaction."
The Guidelines themselves suggest a possible definition of the
concept of "prohibited transaction." As seen above, the Guidelines
provide that a sentencing court must take into account a defendant's
"relevant conduct," which is defined as the "same course of conduct" of the offense of conviction, or as part of a "common scheme
or plan" as the offense of conviction.' 7 7 Judge Wilkins, the Chairman of the Sentencing Commission, has written that the phrase
"same course of conduct" contemplates "that there be sufficient
similarity and temporal proximity to reasonably suggest that repeated instances of criminal behavior constitute a pattern of criminal conduct." 178 This would appear to be an appropriate definition
of "prohibited transaction" injustice Stevens's standard: the "prohibited transaction" to be presented to the jury must include all acts
by the defendant that are part of the same course of conduct or
common scheme or plan; the prosecution cannot prove a small
number of the acts to the jury, and then present the remainder only
to the judge.
As to the federal narcotics laws, it will be recalled that as those
laws are currently interpreted, the jury need only find that a defendant distributed an amount of narcotics; the sentencing judge then
determines the quantity. 79 Justice Stevens's standard would obviously require a change in this procedure. Any determination of
quantity by the sentencing judge would, by definition, be part of the
transaction for which the defendant is to be punished, and also part
of the "prohibited transaction" of Justice Stevens's standard. Consequently, the jury, not the judge, would determine the amount of
narcotics that the defendant was responsible for distributing.
A second part of Justice Stevens's proposed standard that requires elaboration is the nature and relevance of the "stigma" to
177 GUIDELINES, supra note 22, § IB1.3(a)(2); see also supra notes 22-25 (discussing
Guidelines).
178 William W. Wilkins, Jr. &John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstoneof the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495, 515-16 (1990).
179 See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
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which it refers. Although the Court has frequently referred to the
stigma associated with criminal convictions and to the moral force of
the criminal law, and although the criminal law does, in many instances, implicate society's moral imperatives,180 it is not clear what

stigma Justice Stevens has in mind here. Surely there are cases in
which one might argue that an incrementally greater punishment
does not carry with it additional stigma. For example, does a narcotics sentence of twelve years' imprisonment carry with it a greater
stigma than one of ten years? Perhaps the answer is "yes," but if it
is, then it would appear that any greater sentence carries with it a
greater stigma than a lighter sentence. If this is true, then the reference to "stigma" in Justice Stevens's proposed formulation is redundant with the reference to "punishment." On the other hand, if
the answer is "no" - if, that is, a twelve year narcotics sentence
does not carry a greater stigma than a ten year one - then it is hard
to see why the notion of stigma is relevant. Winship held that the
relevant facts against a person must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt before that person may suffer punishment. The punishment
itself, and the hardship that it imposes on a person, should be sufficient to require the heightened standard of proof. Thus, it should
be sufficient to take Justice Stevens's approach in any case involving
"special punishment," and to dispense altogether with the requirement of "stigma." i81
Finally, there is the question of what "special punishment"
means. It cannot mean punishment that is beyond the range available without a finding about a particular fact; such an interpretation
would be a reaffirmation of the greater-includes-the-lesser argument against which Justice Stevens argued in his McMillan dissent. 18 2 Rather, in light of that dissent, a "fact that gives rise to
special punishment" must be any fact that has a harmful effect on
the defendant's potential sentence. Thus, for example, where - as in
McMillan - the establishment of a fact makes it less likely (or impossible) for a defendant to get the minimum sentence, such a fact
would be a "fact that gives rise to special punishment," notwith180 See generally The Expressive Function of Punishment, in J.

FEINBERG,

DOING AND

(1970).
181 The only imaginable situation in which that stigma would be relevant would

DESERVING

be when the defendant contends that he is insane, and thus must be treated but not
punished. There is, unquestionably, a stigma connected with a finding of insanity,
but indeed there is no punishment. I am not entirely sure how, or whether, Justice

Stevens's proposed standard would apply to such a situation. It is, however, a relatively rare occurrence, and I will not explore it here.
182 See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 103 (1986)
dissenting).

(Stevens, J.,
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standing that the punishment ultimately received was within the
range that the defendant might have received even had the fact not
been established.'
Obviously, facts like those at issue in Walton,
the establishment of which gave rise to a greater punishment than
would otherwise have been available, are also "facts that give rise to
special punishment."
In light of these clarifications, a possible test might be formulated thus:
The government is required to prove to the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt anyfact that (A) is part of a prohibited transaction- including
(i) all narcotics that may be attributed to the defendant (in a federal
narcotics case), and (ii) all "relevant conduct" of the defendant (in a
case governed by the Guidelines) - and that (B) has a harmful effect
on the defendant's potential sentence.

As stated, the test avoids the due process problems of the other proposed solutions for it honors the principle of Winship by preventing
the legislature from constructing a statutory system in which a defendant's punishment is enhanced by factors not found beyond a
reasonable doubt. Moreover, it avoids Walton's evisceration of the
Sixth Amendment, for it makes the jury the finder of fact for any
parts of the criminal transaction. Finally, it allows the sentencing
court latitude to fashion a sentence that takes into account the defendant's "life and characteristics," which is ideally what a sentencing judge should do.
Such an approach would substantially change current practices
in federal courts. With respect to sentencing for convictions under
the federal narcotics laws, it would require the jury, not the judge,
to determine the amount of narcotics that the defendant distributed,
for that is the determinative factor in the defendant's sentence, and
it is within the scope of the jury's responsibility to find it. Similarly,
because relevant conduct, rather than the offense of conviction, is
the basis for a defendant's sentence under the Guidelines, all of the
183

This interpretation of the term "special punishment" is supported by Lindsey

v. 1ashington, 301 U.S. 397 (1937), in which the Supreme Court struck down on ex
post facto grounds the application of a law that narrowed a defendant's potential
sentence so that he was eligible to receive only the maximum term of imprisonment
that had been available to him at the time that he committed his crime. See Lindsey
v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (1937). In Lindsey, the Court held that the defendant's
lost opportunity for a lesser sentence was, in itself, sufficient to create an ex postfacto
violation. Id. at 401-02. See also Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429-36 (1987) (applying ex postfacto analysis to application of Florida's revised sentencing guidelines);
United States v. Saucedo, 950 F.2d 1508, 1515 n.12 (10th Cir. 1991) (ex post facto
analysis applies to enhanced Guidelines); United States v. Bell, 788 F. Supp. 413,
416-22 (N.D. Iowa 1992) (same).
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facts that constitute relevant conduct would have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, it is clear that a court could not
impose additional penalties on the basis of conduct that a jury has
expressly found not to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
D.

Five Potential Objections to the Proposed Standard

One objection to the approach set forth in this Article is that
it would unduly constrain sentencingjudges. As seen above, sentencing has historically been left to judges rather than juries because sentencing involves a multifaceted calculation, and
requires a careful balancing of ends - retribution, general deterrence and rehabilitation - that is beyond the scope of the jury's
function. 8' 4 By requiring the jury to decide any facts that occurred during the criminal transaction that may adversely affect
the defendant's sentence, this argument runs, the sentencing
judge's hands will be tied, and she will be unable to carry out her
delicate task.
The answer to this objection is that the proposed standard
takes away from the sentencing court only certain factual findings; it does not, however, limit the way in which the sentencing
judge weighs and balances the various factors and concerns in
determining a sentence. The distinction drawn between findings
of fact and sentencing decisions is a reasonable one: finding facts
is precisely the job of the jury, and determining the correct sentence, given the facts found by the jury, is the proper province of the
judge. It remains for the sentencing judge to determine what
sentence would best serve the law's penalogical objectives.
A second potential objection is rooted in the notion that historical practice has probative value in the analysis of constitutional issues. 185 A constitutional standard, such as the one
proffered in this Article, that does not have historical precedent
indeed bears a greater burden than one that does. History, however, cannot control constitutional analysis.' 8 6 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that due process requires states to institute procedures that were not historically required;' 8 v there184
185

186
187

See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 2577 (1992).
See generally J.H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 60-63 (1980).
See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (right to psychiatric examina-

tion in certain circumstances); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (right
to production of certain evidence); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (right
to hearing and counsel before probation is revoked); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333 (1966) (right to protection from prejudicial publicity); Brady v. Maryland,
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fore, history's hold is necessarily limited. Moreover, the history
of criminal sentencing is not as monolithic as might be thought;
because there are various traditions within the field of criminal
sentencing, there must be some care given in determining which
tradition is most relevant to any particular case. For example,
judicial discretion was substantially circumscribed in capital cases
at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted; 88 therefore, in any
particular case one might ask which tradition is more relevant,
the general sentencing tradition, in which the sentencing judge's
discretion is vast, or the tradition in capital cases, with its more
limited discretion? 89 Similarly, some crimes are relatively new,
originating from statutes rather than the common law. To take
an important example, there were no federal criminal narcotics
laws until the Harrison Act of 1914. Arguably, any tradition associated with federal narcotics sentencing, being of such recent
vintage, would have less force than a tradition of longer standing.
Thus, the proffered constitutional standard might face a different
historical burden as applied to federal narcotics crimes than as
applied to other crimes. Once again, the question is which tradition is more relevant: the relatively stronger general tradition of
sentencing, or the relatively weaker tradition of sentencing in
federal narcotics cases? Finally, the hold of history in federal
sentencing procedure is especially weak because the Guidelines
have made wholesale changes in how defendants are sentenced.
Given those changes, it would be reasonable to suppose that the
claims of tradition, whatever they may be in any particular case,
are weaker under the Guidelines than they might be in other
contexts.
A third potential objection to the proposed standard is that
it does not go far enough. As noted above, a sentencing judge
may impose an especially harsh sentence on a defendant due to
"background facts" regarding the defendant. 9 ° One might argue that the jury should be required to find all facts about a defendant that may have a harmful effect on the defendant's
potential sentence.
373 U.S. 83 (1963) (due process right to discovery of exculpatory evidence); Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (due process right to a trial transcript on appeal).
188 See Welsh S. White, Fact-finding and the Death Penalty: The Scope of a CapitalDefendant's Right to Jury Trial, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1989).
189 Cf LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 944 (1978) ("[I]t makes
all the difference in the world what level of generality one employs to test the pedigree of an asserted liberty claim.").
190 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 92-95.
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The first problem with this objection is that it is plainly impractical. If sentencing is to be at all flexible and attentive to the
particular features of each defendant, then it is probably impossible to determine all of the factors that contribute to the sentence
in every case. Requiring a jury to find every fact relevant to a
defendant's sentence would convert every jury from being finders of fact about a particular crime to a miniature probation department, and would unacceptably prolong every trial. Second,
asking the jury to expand its focus beyond the alleged criminal
transaction would risk severe prejudice. Unattractive background information might turn a jury against a defendant even if
there is insufficient evidence of the crime charged. By requiring
the jury to focus exclusively on the alleged criminal transaction,
the jury is prevented from receiving information that may prejudice it for or against the defendant.
A fourth objection is that the proposed standard is too narrow because it requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt only for
aggravatingfactors, that is, factors that increase a defendant's sentence. Instead, according to this objection, the jury should be
required to find all facts that are part of the criminal transaction
that have any potential impact, beneficial or harmful, to the defendant's sentence. The basis for this objection is that just as
aggravating facts - like the depravity with which a murder was
committed'' - are judgments properly made by the community's foremost moral voice, mitigating factors should be as well.
For example, a statute might provide a lesser penalty if it is found
that the criminal act was done for humanitarian reasons (say, a
mercy killing) than if it was performed for particularly heinous
reasons (say, a murder for hire). The jury should characterize
the reasons for the act, this objection runs, whether those reasons are potentially aggravating or mitigating, for in either case it
is important for the jury's moral voice to be heard.
This objection calls for, of course, an extention of the proposed standard rather than a limitation of it. The proposed extention may be warranted but, before adopting it, it is important
to recognize that aggravating and mitigating factors need not be
treated identically for all purposes, and probably should not be.
As argued above, Winship and its progeny demand that any alleged aggravating facts occurring during the prohibited transaction must be proven by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt;
there is no such constitutional restriction on alleged mitigating
191 See Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3052 (1990).
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factors. Indeed, a legislature could constitutionally require the
defendant to bear the burden of proving the existence of mitigating factors, 9 2 and impose on the defendant any burden of proof
it chose. One argument against the amendment to the proposed
standard, however, is that it might create confusion; a jury would
be required to find certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt with
the burden on the Government, and at the same time find other
facts by a lesser standard with the burden on the defendant. The
danger of confusion is real, difficult to measure, and a possible
argument against leaving mitigating factors for the jury.'9 3 I
leave the possible extension of the proposed standard for future
consideration and debate.
The final objection that I shall consider here is that legislatures could easily override the proposed standard's protections
for criminal defendants. Once again, the objection focuses on
the distinction between aggravating and mitigating factors. Because the proposed standard requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt only for aggravating factors, a legislature could avoid the
standard by defining an offense broadly with a harsh sentence,
and then placing the burden of proof on the defendant to
demonstrate specified mitigating factors.1 9 4 To take a hypothetical example, the proposed standard would prohibit a law providing that bank robbers would be sentenced to five years'
imprisonment unless the court found by a preponderance of the
evidence that the robber used a gun, in which case his sentence
would be ten years' imprisonment. The standard would not,
192 It is, indeed, the general rule that whichever party would receive a benefit by
the establishment of a particular fact in a sentencing proceeding bears the burden
of proof of that fact. See, e.g., United States v. Anders, 956 F.2d 907, 911 (9th Cir.
1992) ("defendant bears the burden of proving the appropriateness of a downward
departure") (citation omitted); United States v. Rutana, 932 F.2d 1155, 1159 (6th
Cir. 1991) (citations omitted) ("the burden of persuading the sentencing court that
a downward departure is warranted rests with the defendant"), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 300 (1991); United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 1989) (burden of proof falls on party seeking to adjust the offense level); United States v.
Urrego-Linares, 879 F.2d 1234, 1238-39 (4th Cir.) ("defendant has the burden of
establishing ... the applicability of the mitigating factor in question"), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 943 (1989).
193 The danger of confusion might be diminished by the use of special verdict
forms. Cf. Griffin v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 466, 475 (1991) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (commending the use of special interrogatories for the jury in "complex
conspiracy prosecutions").
194 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 100 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("States may reach the same destination either by criminalizing conduct and allowing an affirmative defense, or by prohibiting lesser conduct and enhancing the
penalty ... ").

1993]

CRIMINAL SENTENCING

507

however, prohibit a law that imposed a sentence of ten years imprisonment on all bank robbers unless they could demonstrate to
the sentencing judge that they had not used a gun in connection
with the robbery, in which case they would receive only five years'
imprisonment. The danger envisioned by this objection is that if
the proposed standard were in fact adopted, and if, in response,
Congress or a state legislature changed the criminal laws in the
way just described, then criminal defendants would be in the
anomalous position of being worse off as a direct result of the
95
strengthening of their constitutional rights.
The response to this objection is that it is too speculative.
One cannot determine the wisdom or constitutionality of a proposed rule by speculating about what a legislature might do.' 9 6
For example, law-abiding citizens may be so outraged by a defendant's constitutional right against self-incrimination that they
sanction harsher criminal penalties than they otherwise would
have; such speculation, though, hardly justifies reinterpretation
and evisceration of the Fifth Amendment. Moreover, even if, in
response to the judicial adoption of the Stevens proposal, a legislature did pass a mitigating factor statute that, with other things
being equal, put a criminal defendant in a worse place than that
defendant would have been had the McMillan-Walton doctrine
been in force, that would still not be an argument against the
proposed standard. A criminal defendant does not have a right
to the criminal justice system of her choosing. Finally, even if the
objection were more troubling, it could be avoided by amending
the proposed standard in the manner described in connection
with the objection considered immediately above-i.e., the present objection could be met if the proposed standard were extended such that the jury was required to find all facts part of the
criminal transaction and that have a potential impact, beneficial
or harmful, on the defendant's sentence.
195 In other words, any rational criminal defendant would say to himself: "I
would rather be a part of (i) a legal regime pursuant to which I am guaranteed a
minimum punishment if I am found guilty of a crime, which punishment can be
enhanced if the State proves, even by a very low standard of proof, certain additional factors [i.e., the current McMillan-[Walton doctrine], than (ii) a legal regime
that guarantees me a maximum punishment if I am found guilty of a crime, which
punishment will be reduced only if I satisfy the burden of proof with respect to
certain mitigating factors [i.e., the legal regime that would obtain if the proposed
standard were adopted and legislatures responded by passing mitigating factor
statutes]."
196 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 100-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION

If we have not yet reached the point at which sentences are
determined before trials are held, we have arrived at a point in
which a criminal defendant's fate could depend to a far greater
degree on allegations made and facts established in the sentencing phase than on the charges contained in the indictment and
the facts established at trial. The importance of the sentencing
phase of the trial has been made possible by the Supreme Court's
McMillan-Walton doctrine, an abandonment of the rights to due
process and a criminal jury trial. The proposal set forth in this
Article would place firm and sensible limits on criminal
sentencing.
One question not considered here is why issues have been
transferred to the sentencing phase of trials from the guilt-determination phase: What sociological or political factors have led
courts and legislators to permit and encourage the rise of sentencing facts and the fall of criminal acts? At least two factors
may be at work.
First, people's anger at what they perceive to be growing
rates of criminality has likely led them to favor approaches that
are "tough on crime," such as the McMillan-Walton doctrine, and
laws that make it easier to convict and punish defendants. While
such anger is understandable, it is precisely the purpose of a
criminal defendant's constitutional rights to protect the defendant against the anger that people naturally feel and to assure the
defendant a fair trial and correct punishment.
Second, the empowerment of judges that is implied by the
increased importance of sentencing facts is consistent with a phenomenon increasingly prevalent in the law: the shifting of power
from citizens to "experts," and, more generally, from those who
are relatively accountable to those who are not. As more decisions are undertaken by administrative bodies rather than by
state legislatures or Congress, 97 more decisions may be made by
judges rather than by juries. To the extent that the jury's role is
diminished, one of the fundamental values underlying the right
197 One prominent example is the Guidelines themselves, which were created
when a relatively accountable body, Congress, turned lawmaking authority over to
an unaccountable body, the Sentencing Commission. Of course, the Guidelines
have been upheld by the Supreme Court in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361
(1989), against the charge that they were passed pursuant to an unlawful delegation
of authority.
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the involvement of the citizenry in governmental af-

is diminished as well.
Like any other doctrine that is the product of judicial decisions, though, the McMillan-Walton doctrine need not be the final
word on the relation between criminal acts and sentencing facts.
Congress or any state legislature can change what the judiciary
hath wrought. Congress could draw a firmer line between criminal acts and sentencing facts; it could accomplish by statute what
Justice Stevens and this Article have argued is required as a matter of constitutional principle.'" 8 It would be particularly fitting
for Congress to correct the current situation by passing a statute
that would regulate federal criminal procedure and statutes in
the manner suggested here. By rectifying the situation itself,
Congress would at once open the door for citizens, through their
participation in juries, to exercise power in self-government and provide an example of the exercise of such power.

fairs

198 On Congress's special obligation to avoid laws that may pass judicial scrutiny
but strain constitutional values and approach the outer boundaries of what is constitutionally permissible, see Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975); William Cohen, CongressionalPower
to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975).

